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assets in the U.S.
In 1994 the U.S. held claims on foreign-
ers worth $3.0 trillion, while foreigners
were holding $3.3 trillion in claims on
the U.S., leaving the U.S. with a net
foreign debt position of around $311
billion or 4.4% of 1994 gross domestic
product (GDP). Over
the next ten years the
U.S. accumulated a
string of record nom-
inal current account
deficits, which raised
the level of U.S. net
foreign debt to $2.4
trillion or 23% of
2002 GDP (see fig-
ure 1). This rapid in-
flow of capital from
abroad has prompt-
ed policymakers and
the financial press to
speculate that these
flows are tied to a
temporary improve-
ment in the expect-
ed return on U.S.
assets and to express serious concern
about the economic consequences of
a similarly rapid outflow of capital from
the U.S. if these favorable conditions
should dissipate.1 This Chicago Fed Letter
retraces the evolution of the U.S.’s net
foreign debt position and its various
components over the last ten years.
How worrisome is the U.S. net foreign debt position?
by Michael Kouparitsas, economist
The sizable inflows of capital to the U.S. from abroad in recent years have raised
concerns about the potential impact on the U.S. economy if the tide were to turn.
This article argues that the rapid accumulation of U.S. net foreign debt is tied to
permanent rather than temporary changes in the relative return on U.S. assets, so in
the absence of any other shocks to the global economy, a capital outflow is unlikely.
I argue that the rapid accumulation of
U.S. net foreign debt was tied to perma-
nent rather than temporary changes
in the relative return on U.S. assets, so
in the absence of any other shocks to
the global economy, a capital outflow
is unlikely.
What causes the level of net foreign
debt to change?
A useful starting point in any discussion
of foreign debt is a review of basic na-
tional accounting concepts. There are
two key relationships. The first is the
basic national accounting identity famil-
iar to all economics undergrads, which
states that the sum of consumption, in-
vestment, government spending, and
exports less imports equals gross domes-
tic product. The second is less familiar
and can best be described as the nation-
al flow budget constraint. This relation-
ship restricts the sum of all expenditures
(consumption, investment, government
spending, and the change in net foreign
assets) to be no greater than the sum
of all income (gross domestic product
plus net foreign income). Net foreign
income is the difference between wag-
es, rent, and interest paid by foreign-
ers for use of U.S. human, physical, or
financial capital and the wages, rent,
and interest paid by the U.S. to foreign-
ers for use of their human, physical,
and financial capital, while net foreign2. U.S. current account
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assets are the difference between the
U.S.’s foreign assets and its foreign lia-
bilities. If the value of net foreign assets
is negative (i.e., liabilities exceed assets),
we refer to the U.S. as a net debtor. Com-
bining the national accounting identity
and national flow budget constraint, it
follows that the sum of the trade balance
(exports less imports) and the income
account balance (net foreign income)
equals the change in net foreign assets.
The sum of the trade balance and in-
come balance determines the balance
of the current account, so a current
account surplus leads to an accumula-
tion of foreign assets, while a current
account deficit leads to a rundown of
foreign assets or an accumulation of
net foreign debt.
U.S. international transactions over
the last ten years
As figure 2 shows, the U.S. has been run-
ning a trade deficit for about the last
30 years, indicating that Americans spent
more on foreign goods (imports) than
foreigners spent on U.S. goods (exports)
over this period. In contrast, the U.S.
has recorded a surplus, albeit diminish-
ing, on its income account over the en-
tire sample period. The U.S. has been
a net debtor for the last 20 years, so a
surplus on the income account indicates
that not only has income received from
abroad been higher than income paid
to foreigners, but also that the rate of
return on U.S. assets held abroad has
been considerably higher than the rate
of return foreigners have earned on
their assets held in the U.S. (In fact,
the return differential has been high
enough to cause the U.S. to pay effec-
tively a zero or negative rate of interest
on its net foreign debt).
My discussion in the last section glossed
over another element in the national
flow budget constraint, which is net of-
ficial transfers. These transactions also
enter the current account. A negative
value indicates higher official transfers
from the U.S government to foreign
governments than from foreign govern-
ments to the U.S. government. With
the exception of 1991, the U.S. has
typically recorded a transfer deficit.2
Over the last 30 years, the income
a reversal in the U.S. current account
balance, then the current levels of debt
are not sustainable. Freund’s analysis,
in contrast, estimates the average path
of the current account of countries that
have had persistent current account
deficits (i.e., a deficit over 2% of GDP
for four or five years). This approach
generates a typical response to an un-
known disturbance. Based on such in-
complete analysis, it is impossible to
say what the likely trajectory of the U.S.
current account is to a particular source
of economic disturbance. Knowing the
response to a particular disturbance is
important to the current debate, because
1) most of the candidate shocks affect-
ing the U.S. economy over the last ten
years appear to be permanent shocks
(e.g., level of U.S. productivity), 2) the-
oretical models suggest that the effects
of permanent and temporary shocks on
the U.S. economy are likely to have dif-
ferent implications for the U.S. current
account, and 3) Freund argues that her
estimated responses are largely a func-
tion of temporary business cycle shocks.
It is beyond the scope of this article to
estimate and simulate a structural econo-
metric model of the world economy to
assess the sustainability of U.S. foreign
debt. I take the next best alternative,
which is to simulate a computable gener-
al equilibrium model of the global econ-
omy calibrated to represent the U.S. and
two other regions—a composite of all
account surplus has
been completely off-
set by official trans-
fer deficits, so the
U.S. has recorded
current account def-
icits that closely fol-
low the path of its
trade deficits.
Figure 2 reveals that
from 1994 to 1997,
the U.S. trade and
current account
deficit held steady
at around 1.5% of
GDP. After that they
jumped by just over
1% of GDP per year
to their current level
of just under 5% of GDP. These chang-
es are echoed by the acceleration in the
level of U.S. indebtedness as a percent-
age of gross domestic output over the
1990s in figure 1; the net debt level rose
from 4.4% percent of GDP in 1994 to
23% of GDP in 2002, with the bulk of
that change occurring after 1997.3
Should we be concerned about
this path?
The persistent and widening U.S. cur-
rent account deficit to GDP ratios over
the last ten years, combined with a di-
minishing income balance and a rap-
idly rising net debt to GDP ratio have
led many commentators to ask whether
these paths are sustainable. Some have
argued, based on research studies such
as Freund (2000), that a reversal in the
U.S. current account balance (capital
outflow) is necessary to move U.S. net
foreign debt to a sustainable level.  How-
ever, there are a number of drawbacks
to this line of research. The ideal ap-
proach would be to estimate a structur-
al model of the global economy that
identifies both the sources of econom-
ic disturbance and the responses to
these disturbances. The sustainability
of the current path of the U.S.’s exter-
nal accounts could be analyzed by sim-
ulating this model under plausible
assumptions about the sources of eco-
nomic disturbance that have affected the
U.S. and global economy over the last
ten years. If the simulations generateMichael H. Moskow, President; Charles L. Evans,
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other industrial countries and a com-
posite of all developing countries. The
objective of households and firms in
all countries/regions of the model is to
maximize their well-being and profits,
so the simulated paths of U.S. and for-
eign net foreign debt reflect the opti-
mal decisions of all agents. I simulate
the model under a range of plausible
assumptions about the sources of eco-
nomic disturbance that have affected the
U.S. economy over the last ten years.4
Deciding on the candidate shocks was
relatively easy since pessimistic and op-
timistic commentators to a large extent
agree on the events that have shaped
the U.S. net debt position since 1994:
a persistent increase in the growth rate
of U.S. productivity; the Asian financial
crisis of 1997; and the growth of bilateral
trade liberalization agreements between
the U.S. and its various trading partners.
Productivity
Most analysts agree that the U.S. has ex-
perienced at least a temporary increase
in its productivity growth rate of about
1 percentage point from the second half
of the 1990s through to the present.5
So how did this temporary increase have
a permanent impact on the economy?
By producing a permanent change in
the level of productivity. The temporary
increase in the productivity growth rate
has raised the level of U.S. productivity
by about 7% since the mid-1990s. My
benchmark simulation assumes that
there was a onetime increase in the
level of U.S. productivity of 1%. I find
that a permanent 1% shock to the level
of productivity permanently raises the
debt to GDP ratio by a little over 5% of
GDP (reaching this level about ten years
after the shock), with roughly half of
the adjustment occurring after two years.
Based on these results, a permanent in-
crease in the level of U.S. productivity
of 7% could easily account for the 20
percentage point change in the U.S.
debt to GDP ratio since mid-1994.
Asian financial crisis
The U.S. current account deficit to GDP
ratio jumped from 1.5% in 1997 to 2.3%
in 1998, which had led many commen-
tators to speculate that the worsening
U.S. current account deficit was driven,
in part, by capital flows from Asia in
the wake of the Asian financial crisis.6
This argument assumes that the uncer-
tainty surrounding the Asian economies
during the crisis raised the risk-adjusted
return on assets held in the U.S. If this
was a permanent shock to the risk-ad-
justed return of U.S. assets, then this
capital will remain in the U.S. On the
other hand, if the shock was temporary,
then a resolution of the uncertainty sur-
rounding Asian economies would cause
an outflow of capital from the U.S.
Uncertainty does not play a role in my
stylized global model. However, we can
use it to sort out whether perceived
changes in the relative returns from in-
vesting in the U.S. versus Asia were per-
manent by simulating the model under
a temporary and a permanent shock
to developing region productivity. Ac-
cording to my model, the observed
changes in U.S.–Asian relative goods
prices, trade flows, and capital flows over
the last six years are consistent with a
permanent negative shock to the rela-
tive return from investing in Asia. This
suggests that in the absence of other glo-
bal shocks, capital that flowed to the
U.S. in response to the Asian crisis will
remain here. Furthermore, my simula-
tions imply that a negative 1% shock
to the level of Asian productivity results
in a permanent rise of the U.S. net debt
to GDP ratio of 0.5%, which suggests
this may have been a quantitatively im-
portant source of change in the U.S.
net debt to GDP ratio.
Trade liberalization
In 1998 the U.S. Congress established a
bipartisan commission, the U.S. Trade
Deficit Review Commission (USTDRC),
to look into the perceived trade deficit
problem. One of the questions posed
by the commission was the role that trade
liberalization played in the persistent
U.S. trade deficit. I examined this ques-
tion using the same stylized model de-
scribed above. I approached it from a
few different angles. First, much of the
U.S.’s efforts to liberalize trade in the
1990s involved far-reaching agreements
with developing countries, so I simu-
lated the model under the assumption
that the U.S. and developing region
liberalized their bilateral trade. Trade
liberalization is similar to a permanent
shock to the productivity of both coun-
tries, so it is not surprising to find that
bilateral liberalization leads to an in-
crease in the net foreign debt of both
liberalizing parties in comparison to
the rest of the world.
Second, I examined whether there was
anything unique about liberalizing trade
with a developing country (that is, with
a relatively more labor intensive pro-
ducer), by simulating the model under
the assumption that the U.S. and the
industrial region liberalized their trade.
According to my calibrated model, the
U.S. economy’s response to trade lib-
eralization is the same whether the trade
partner is a developing country or an
industrial country. Finally, much of the
world has been engaged in multi-region
and bilateral agreements, so I simulat-
ed the model under the assumption
that the industrial and developing re-
gions liberalized their bilateral trade. As
expected, the indebtedness of these re-
gions rose, while the level of U.S. net for-
eign debt fell. In light of these findings,
the answer to the USTDRC question is
that trade liberalization has likely been
a source of capital inflows to the U.S,
but given the trend toward liberalization
in the rest of the world, these capitalinflows have probably been offset by
outflows from the U.S. to other liberal-
izing regions.
Conclusion
Several commentators have voiced
concern that the current U.S. net for-
eign debt position is unsustainable
1 See C. Mann, 2002, “Perspectives on the
U.S. current account deficit and sustain-
ability,” Journal of Economic Perspectives,
Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 131–152; International
Monetary Fund, 2002, “Essays on trade and
finance,” in World Economic Outlook, Sep-
tember, chapter 2, pp. 65–107; C. Freund,
2000, “Current account adjustments in
industrial countries,” Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, Interna-
tional Finance, discussion paper, No. 692;
The Economist, 2003, “The price profliga-
cy,” September 18; and U.S. Trade Deficit
Review Commission, 2000, Final Report,
November 14, at www.ustdrc.gov.
2 The surplus in 1991 came about because
of net transfer payments to the U.S. asso-
ciated with the war in the Persian Gulf.
3 The change in the level of U.S. net foreign
debt does not equal the sum of accumulat-
ed current account deficits over this period
due to valuation adjustments coming from
fluctuations in nominal exchange rates and
foreign stock price movements. See Cedric
Tille, 2003, “The impact of exchange rate
movements on U.S. foreign debt,” Current
Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York, for more details.
4 The model used here is a variant of the well-
known and widely studied dynamic two-
country, one-sector, open-economy model.
See D. Backus, P. Kehoe, and F. Kydland,
1995, “International business cycles, theory,
and evidence,” in Frontiers of Business Cycle
Research, T. Cooley (ed.), Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, pp. 331–357,
for details. I deviate from this basic
and that the adjustment to a sustain-
able debt level may involve a painful
reversal of the current account that
would lead to lower levels of GDP,
consumption, and investment. This
article questions these pessimistic pre-
dictions by showing that the current path
of U.S. net foreign debt is consistent
two-region/-country model of industrial
regions/countries by introducing a third
region, which is calibrated to capture sa-
lient features of developing countries and
by allowing countries to trade bonds. The
most important differences between the
developing and industrial regions are that
labor is used more intensively in the pro-
duction of the developing region good and
the developing region is about two-thirds
the size of an industrial region. The sim-
ulation results are presented for illustra-
tive purposes and should not be interpret-
ed as forecasts of the quantities and prices.
5 See note 1.
6 See J. Hervey and M. Kouparitsas, 2000,
“Should we be concerned about the current
account?,” Chicago Fed Letter, Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago, April, for details.
with simulated responses to widely
agreed upon permanent increases in
relative productivity of the U.S. econo-
my. In light of this, I argue that in the
absence of an unanticipated shock to
the global economy, the current path
of U.S. net debt is sustainable.